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RECENT DECISIONS

Slanderous Communication to Clergyman Held Absolutely Privileged
Plaintiff brought an action for defamation of character against his former wife
and two other women on the ground that
they had given defamatory testimony to
priests for use in proceedings before a Catholic Church tribunal. Defendant-wife alleged that the defamatory remarks were
made solely for the purpose of obtaining
the church's sanction of her contemplated
divorce. Defendant further alleged that the
two co-defendants were present in order
to corroborate her testimony, such corroboration being required by the church. The
Court upon these stipulated facts summarily dismissed the complaint and held that
confidential slanderous testimony, received
as part of such religious proceeding, is
absolutely privileged and therefore inadmissible by virtue of an Iowa statute' and
the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 230 F. Supp.
39 (N.D. Iowa 1964).
1 IOWA

CODE ANN.

§ 622.10 (1950):

"No prac-

ticing attorney, counselor, physician, surgeon, or
the stenographer or confidential clerk of any
such person, who obtains such information by
reason of his employment, minister of the gospel
or priest of any denomination shall be allowed,
in giving testimony, to disclose any confidential
communication properly entrusted to him in his
professional capacity, and necessary and proper
to enable him to discharge the functions of his
office according to the usual course of practice
or discipline.

Such prohibition shall not apply

to cases where the party in whose favor the same
is made waives the right conferred."

Prior to the Reformation confidential
communications between clergyman and
penitent were regarded as privileged, primarily because of the close relationship
which existed between the Catholic Church
and the civil authority.' This was exemplified by the full acceptance of the "seal of
confession" by the English heads of state.After the Reformation, however, confidential communications between clergyman
and penitent were not regarded as privileged at common law.4 The manifestation
of the common-law rule is evident in Dubarre v. Livette 5 wherein the court held
that a confession made to a clergyman
could be admitted into evidence. The frequent refusal of common-law courts to
recognize the privilege prompted individual judges to withhold compliance in order
to avoid citing clergymen in contempt of
7
court.6 The judge in Broad v. Pitt,
although recognizing that no privilege existed at common law, vowed that he would
never compel a clergyman to testify.

2

13

CATH.

ENCYC.

649, 652 (1912).

3 Ibid.

4 Broad v. Pitt, 3 Car. & P. 518, 172 Eng. Rep.

528 (Ct. C.P. 1828) (dictum); Dubarre v. Livette, Peake N.P. 108, 170 Eng. Rep. 96, 97
(K.B. 1791) (confession to a Protestant clergyman was admitted in evidence); Wheeler v. Le
Marchant, 17 Ch. D. 675, 681 (C.A. 1881)
(dictum). See also 13 CATH. ENCYC., op. cit.
supra note 2, at 656.
5Peake N.P. 108, 170 Eng. Rep. 96, 97 (K.B.
1791).
6 Broad v. Pitt, supra note 4.
7 Ibid.
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The influence of the English common
law on the United States resulted in a
refusal by our courts to recognize this
privilege as one of the traditional equitable
rules determining the admissibility of evidence." However, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in
Mullen v. United States,9 acknowledging
the lack of the privilege at common law,
held that sound "reason and experience"
call for the recognition of the privilege,
"and the dead hand of the common law
will not restrain such recognition."' 0 To
rectify the common-law situation a great
majority of American jurisdictions have
enacted statutes extending the privilege of
nondisclosure to the priest-penitent relationship."
In most jurisdictions the statutes establishing the privilege have been strictly
construed."1 The courts have required that
the facts of each case must fall squarely
within the requirements of the statutes as
construed by the courts before the protection will be extended."1 A notable exception
to this interpretation is the construction of
8People v. Phillips, (N.Y. Ct. of Gen. Sess.
1813), discussed in I CATHOLIC LAW. 199
(1955); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky.
557, 560, 221 S.W.2d. 87, 89 (1949); State v.
Morehous, 97 N.J.L. 285, 290, 117 Atl. 296,
300 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922). Cf. Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876) (dictum);
McMann v. Securities & Exec. Comm'n, 87 F.2d
377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937) (dictum); United States
v. Keeney, 111 F. Supp. 233, 234 (D.D.C.
1953) (dictum).
9 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
"ld. at 279.
L8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2395 n.1 (rev. ed.

1961).
"2Johnson v. Commonwealth, supra note 8;
Note, 12 S.C.L.Q. 440, 446 (1960); 58 AM.
JuR. Witnesses § 532 (1938). Contra, People v.
Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 126 N.E.2d 559 (1955)
(dictum).
"3Johnson v. Commonwealth, supra note 8.

the New York statute 14 by the courts of
that state.15 In conjunction with their liberal approach, the New York courts have
held that membership in the church is not
a prerequisite to claiming the privilege16
and that the communications between
priest and penitent need only be confidential. 17 The courts have thus encouraged
"uninhibited communications" through a
broad and liberal interpretation of the
8
statute.1
The extent of the privilege in the United
States has, to a great degree, rested on interpretation by the courts of the various
state statutes. The courts in applying the
statutes to the facts of each case have held
that a confession is privileged when it is
penitential and made in confidence to a
clergyman in his professional capacity
while spiritual or religious aid is sought; 19
hence, the courts have uniformly held that
communications must be penitential to fall
within the protection of the privilege. 20
The statutes, although not uniform, describe statements by a penitent as being
"confessions. '' 21 The construction of this
14 CPLR 4505: "Unless the person confessing
waives the privilege, a clergyman, or other
minister of any religion, shall not be allowed to
disclose a confession made to him in his professional character as spiritual advisor."
15People v. Shapiro, supra note 12.
16 Kohloff v. Savings Bank, 233 N.Y.S.2d. 849,
850 (Civ. Ct. 1962).
17Compare Westover v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
99 N.Y. 56, 1 N.E. 104, 105 (1885) (dictum),
with People v. Shapiro, supra note 12.
18

People v. Shapiro, supra note 12.

19 Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621, 624
(N.D. Iowa 1963); In re Swenson, 183 Minn.
602, 237 N.W.589 (1931).
20 Johnson v. Commonwealth, supra note 8; In
re Swenson, supra note
EVIDENCE R. 219 (1942).
21

CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §

4505.

19; MODEL

CODE OF

1881 (1959); CPLR

11
term as applied by the courts is aptly stated
in In re Swenson: 22 "the confession contemplated by the statute has reference to a
penitentialacknowledgement to a clergyman
of actual or supposed wrongdoing while
seeking religious or spiritual advice, aid, or
comfort. ' 23 Thus, "penitentiality," implied
by the statutes through the term "confession," must be present before the privilege
will be granted. However, "penitentiality"
is elusive of definition and application. The
American Law Institute's Model Code of
Evidence requires "penitentiality" in the
application of the privilege and describes it
as the essential ingredient of "a confession
of culpable conduct made secretly and in
,24
confidence by a penitent to a priest ....
The necessity of "penitentiality" implies
repentance on the part of the communicant,
without which the statutory privilege cannot be granted. For example, the court in
Johnson v. Commonwealth25 admitted the
testimony of a Methodist minister concerning defendant's admission of guilt to a
murder. The court found that there had
been no indication that the alleged confession was penitential, implying, therefore,
that defendant exhibited no repentance or
26
feeling of guilt.
Besides "penitentiality," clergymen or
penitents seeking the protection of the privilege must show that the statements were
made within the usual course of church
discipline or practice.2" In Sherman v.
22 Supra note 19.
231d. at 603, 237 NW. at 590.

(Emphasis

added.)
24

MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE R.

219 (1942).

310 Ky. 557, 221 S.W.2d 87 (1949).
261 d. at 558, 221 S.W.2d at 89.
27 Kollen v. Wille, 162 Kan. 395, 400, 176 P.2d
25

544, 551 (1883) (the statement made to the
priest was not part of a confession; therefore,
he was not an incompetent witness); In re Swen-
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State -s the defendant was convicted of rape
on the testimony of his victim, corroborated by a letter from the defendant in
which he confessed his sins to a clergyman.
In admitting the letter into evidence, the
court stated that there was no indication
that the church enjoined upon its members
29
the duty to make confessions of sins.
In essence, the court held that in order
for communications to be considered within
the discipline of the church, they must be
made pursuant to a duty enjoined by the
rules and practices of the church.30 A contrary view was espoused in Reutkemeier v.
Nolte, 31 wherein a young unwed mother
confessed her sin before the Presbyterian
Church. The penitent's father attempted
to elicit testimony from the clergyman in
an action for damages for loss of services. 32 The court, in refusing to admit the
testimony, held that "discipline of the
church" encompassed confidential communications made by a penitent or by one
33
simply seeking spiritual relief.
In the previous disposition of the instant
case the Court granted an interlocutory
judgment and found that the alleged defamatory testimony by the defendant-wife
was penitential, within the discipline of the
church and, therefore, privileged.3 4 The
son, supra note 19 (the court took judicial notice of the fact that such discipline is traditionally enjoined upon clergymen by the practice of
their respective churches).
28 170 Ark. 148, 279 S.W. 353 (1926).
2.1Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1914).
32 Ibid.
3 Id. at 345, 161 N.W. at 293.
34 Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621 (N.D.
Iowa 1963), was decided by the court on interlocutory appeal concerning the same parties.
This prior decision held that the priest's testimony was not available on deposition.
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regulations of the church specified that in
certain matrimonial matters tribunals must
be held and that there must be two corroborating witnesses in attendance.35 The
Court, therefore, found no difficulty in
characterizing the communications as being within the discipline of the church as
to all the defendants. The "penitentiality"
of the communications of these witnesses
was open to question. The corroborating
witnesses, although appearing pursuant to
church procedure, were not penitents. The
Court referred to a split in authority concerning the requirement of "penitentiality"
in allowing the privilege. However, no such
hiatus exists and Boyles v. Cora," cited as
authority for this proposition, dealt only
7
with the physician-patient relationship.
In reliance upon this erroneous assumption, the Court adopted the view that anyone seeking religious or spiritual advice,
aid or comfort should be afforded the protection of the privilege.3 It thereby construed the applicable statute"5 and prior
decisions 40 as requiring only that the communications be made to the clergyman in
his professional capacity and within the
41
discipline of the church.
Throughout the development of the
priest-penitent privilege in the Unied
States, statutes have so pre-empted the
field that the reliance by the Court in
the principal case on the free exercise
clause of the first amendment must be considered novel. In considering the free exercise clause the Court concluded that "a

person must be free to say anything and
everything to his church. ' 42 Even as guaranteed by the first amendment, certain requirements must be met as conditions to
the application of the privilege. The Court
suggested that the communications must
be made within a recognized proceeding
of the church, to a recognized official of the
church, and within a sanctioned religious
activity. 43 The crux of the decision resides
in the Court's conviction that no one
should be discouraged through fear of
civil or criminal sanctions from making
44
a communication to a clergyman.
The applicability of the first amendment
granting this privilege via the free exercise
clause will register a great impact on the
area of protected penitential communications. It would appear from this decision
that the only conditions limiting the recognition of the privilege under the guarantee
of the first amendment are that the communications be confidential and within the
sphere of recognized religious activity. In
effect, this decision eliminates the need
for "penitentiality" and broadens the privilege to include all advice, aid and comfort
rendered by a clergyman. Furthermore, all
jurisdictions, regardless of statutory enactment, might now allow the protection of
the privilege based upon the free exercise
clause of the first amendment.
Under our constitution, the supposition
that religious toleration was meant to be
a fundamental principle of government is
hardly disputable. The oppression attendant in compelling a clergyman to testify

35 Id. at 625.

36 232 Iowa 822, 6 N.W.2d 401 (1942).
a Id. at -

, 6 N.W.2d at 411.

Cimijotti v. Paulsen, supra note 34, at 625.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (1950).
40 Cimijotti v. Paulsen, supra note 34, at 624-25.
41 Ibid.
38

39

Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 230 F. Supp. 39, 41-42
(N.D. Iowa 1964).

42

431d. at 41.

44 ibid. See Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d
275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Note, 12 S.C.L.Q.
440, 453 (1960).

11
is diametrical to this view, especially to
Catholic priests who are sworn to the
"seal of confession." Condemnation of
such oppression was espoused by a great
45
opponent of privileges, Jeremy Bentham:
In the character, of penitents, the people
would be pressed with the whole weight
of the penal branch of the law; inhibited
from the exercise of this essential and indispensable article of their religion ...
The advantage gained by the coercion-

gained in the shape of assistance to justice
45

8

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §

2285 (rev. ed. 1961).

Defendant Compelled
to Testify as a
Medical Expert
Plaintiff sued a hospital and several doctors for malpractice. While attempting to
establish her prima facie case she sought
to question one of the defendant-doctors as
to the propriety of the operation which he
had performed. The trial court refused to
allow such testimony and dismissed the action at the close of plaintiff's case; the appellate division affirmed holding that the
plaintiff could not compel the defendantdoctor to testify as an "expert." The Court
of Appeals, in a unanimous decision, reversed and held that a defendant-physician
in a malpractice action could be questioned
as an expert to establish the generally accepted medical practice in the community
in order to determine whether he had deviated from such a standard. McDermott
v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp.,
15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964).
In order for a plaintiff to be successful
in a malpractice action, it is essential for
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-would be casual, and even rare; the mischief produced by it, constant and all ex46
tensive.
Throughout our heritage, the principle
of free exercise of religion has been a basic
tenet of the American philosophy, protecting the rights and practices of churches,
clergymen and parishioners. No practice
could be more inhibitive of this free exercise of religion than the compulsion to
testify to a confidential communication
made within the scope of religious practice.
46 Ibid.

him to establish the standard of care exercised by the doctors practicing in the defendant's locale and to prove a specific
deviation from that standard by the defendant. In the words of Judge Fuld in
the instant case:
The issue whether the defendant-doctor deviated from the proper and approved practice customarily adopted by physicians practicing in the community is assuredly "pertinent and relevant" to a malpractice action.
Indeed, absent such proof, the plaintiff's
case would have to be dismissed.1
Similarly, where the matters relevant to the
case are not within the experience and observation of the ordinary jurymen and the
facts are of such a nature as to require
special knowledge or skill, the opinion of
2
an expert is necessary.
Two facts, of which the Court of Appeals took judicial notice, should be recI McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat

Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 27, 203 N.E.2d 469, 473,
255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 71 (1964).
2 Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y.
389, 396, 34 N.E.2d 367, 370 (1941). See also
Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962).

